Introduction
A standard result in topological dynamics is the existence of minimal subsystem. It is a direct consequence of Zorn's lemma: given a compact topological space X with a map f : X!X; the set of compact non empty subspaces K of X such that f(K) K ordered by inclusion is inductive, and hence has minimal elements. It is natural to ask for a point-free (or formal) formulation of this statement. In a previous work 3], we gave such a formulation for a quite special instance of this statement, which is used in proving a purely combinatorial theorem (van de Waerden's theorem on arithmetical progression).
In this paper, we extend our analysis to the case where X is a boolean space, that is compact totally disconnected. In such a case, we give a point-free formulation of the existence of a minimal subspace for any continuous map f : X!X: We show that such minimal subspaces can be described as points of a suitable formal topology, and the \existence" of such points become the problem of the consistency of the theory describing a generic point of this space. We show the consistency of this theory by building e ectively and algebraically a topological model. As an application, we get a new, purely algebraic proof, of the minimal property of 3]. We show then in detail how this property can be used to give a proof of (a special case of) van der Waerden's theorem on arithmetical progression, that is \similar in structure" to the topological proof 6, 8] , but which uses a simple algebraic remark (proposition 1) instead of Zorn's lemma. A last section tries to place this work in a wider context, as a reformulation of Hilbert's method of introduction/elimination of ideal elements.
1 Construction of Minimal Invariant Subspace
Algebraic formulation
The rst step is to give a purely algebraic formulation of the problem of nding minimal invariant subspace. By Stone duality, the space X can be seen as a boolean algebra B, the elements of this boolean algebra being the clopen subset of the space. A continuous map f : X!X can be seen as an algebra morphism g : B!B. In term of points, g is the inverse image of f:
We are now looking for a minimal non empty closed invariant subset M X: We represent it as a predicate (x) over clopen x 2 B; such that (x) expresses that the minimal closed invariant subset M is a subset of the clopen represented by x: We can characterise such a predicate without explicitly mentioning the subset M by the following properties:
3. if (x) and x y; then (y); 4. if (x) and (y); then (x:y); 5. if (x); then (g(x)); 6. (1 ? x) or (_ i n g i (x)) for some n:
It can be shown that, conversely, if is a predicate over B that satis es these properties, then the closed subset that is the intersection of all clopen satisfying is a closed minimal invariant subset.
Space of minimal subspace
Following 15], we can see the 6 properties as describing \forcing" conditions on a point of a space. This space M can be seen as an in nitary propositional logic de ned inductively by the properties
A point of this space de nes then exactly a closed minimal invariant subset.
We are going to show various properties of this space M; in particular that it is consistent, that is 1 is not covered by the empty set, and that it is positive, that is any cover of 1 is inhabited. The general method we follow for proving these properties is to build e ectively some entailment relations over B that satisfy the two conditions above, and hence contain the entailment relation of the space M: This can be formulated as follows: we realize e ectively the 6 conditions above in a topological model.
A class of intuitionistic models
This class of models is parametrised by an ideal I of the boolean algebra B which is closed under the morphism g : if x 2 I then g(x) 2 I: Given such an ideal, we introduce then the predicate Z I (x) meaning that there exists n such that^i n g Proof: The rst three conditions do not use any special properties of the predicate Z I :
The fourth condition follows from lemma 2.
It is clear that if Z I (z:g(x)); then Z I (z:x) and hence x g(x):
The last condition follows from proposition 1.
An alternative presentation
For the locale-theorist reader not familiar with Sambin's de nition of spaces, we add here an alternative presentation of the space M I : If U is a subset of B; let U ? be the subset of x 2 B such that Z I (xu) for all u 2 U: (It can be checked that u V for all u 2 U is equivalent to V ? U ? :) The space M I can then be described as the locales of all U B such that U = U ?? with for meet operation the intersection, and for in nitary join _U i = ( U i ) ?? : If we interpret (x) as the set fxg ?? ; then we can use this construction to give a topological model of the predicate described above. It can then be checked that all 6 properties characterising the property are realized in this model. In term of points, this means that for proving that an open invariant by f is a covering of the space X; it is enough to show that all minimal point belongs to this open, where a point is minimal i it belongs to a minimal closed invariant subset. Yet another reading is that if we can prove 9x 2 I: (x) for a \generic" satisfying the 6 properties above, then we have 1 2 I: 
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Generalisation to Stone spaces
All these constructions can be generalised to the case of Stone spaces 10] 1 , that can be described as spaces of prime lters of a distributive lattice. Given such a lattice D; and a lattice morphism g; we can associate the formal propositional theory We can then prove as above that the space de ned by this theory is consistent and positive.
Applications 2.1 Application to van der Waerden's theorem
In what follows, we shall show how to give a proof of van der Waerden's theorem on arithmetical progression, that is \similar in structure" to the topological proof presented by Furstenberg and Weiss 6], but is done in an elementary meta-language, and in particular, avoids the use of Zorn's lemma. Such a remark about similarity of proofs appear already in an early appplication of point-free topology in avoiding the use of the axiom of choice 2, 13] in the development of the theory of Banach algebras. In these works the notion of \topology without points" is used to give \a theory entirely parallel to Gelfand's, such that it is possible at every stage to reach the corresponding stage in Gelfand's theory by a simple application of the axiom of choice" 13].
All we shall use of the previous sections is proposition 1. Proof: The set of non empty closed subsets of ordered by containment is such that any chain is dominated, by compactness. By Zorn's lemma, it contains a maximal element, which is clearly of the form ; and is then a minimal subcolouring of : Using this fact allows for an elegant method for showing that a given open U of X such that f ?1 (U) U is the space X : it is enough to show that any minimal colouring is in U.
Indeed, let then be an arbitrary sequence. By proposition 4, we can nd minimal which is a subcolouring of : We have then 2 U: Since 2 ; this implies that U meets ff n ( ) j n 2 Ng, and thus that there is n such that f n ( ) 2 U: Since f ?1 (U) U; this in turn implies 2 U:
The non constructive argument
In order to simplify the presentation, I shall limit the analysis to the non constructive proof that all sequences are in W(3; l) for an arbitrary number l: (The general case could be handled similarly, using for instance the presentation given in 3]). That is, we are going to analyse a proof of the following proposition.
Fact 1: All colourings belong to W(3; l):
Notice that W(3; l) is an open U of X such that f ?1 (U) U: We can hence apply the method derived from proposition 4: in order to prove that W(3; l) = X; it is enough to show that an arbitrary minimal sequence belongs to W(3; l):
We have used proposition 4 to reduce in a non constructive way the fact 1 to the \easier" following proposition.
Fact 2: All minimal colourings belong to W(3; l).
For sake of completeness, we shall give a proof of this fact, which is directly extracted from the arguments in 8]. The result of our analysis is that it is possible to use proposition 1, which is constructive, instead of proposition 4 in order to derive the fact 1. The reader can compare our treatement with the one of Girard's 7], which uses Kreisel's no counterexample interpretation. 
A constructive proof
We now give a proof of fact 1 which is parallel to this proof of fact 2, but uses proposition 1 instead of proposition 4.
The general method that we apply here can be described as follows. In the proof of fact 2, we prove a nitary property of an arbitrary, \generic" minimal sequence. Also, an analysis of this proof reveals that all we are using of such a minimal sequence is the predicate over blocks:
A is a subblock of : This predicate can also be de ned in term of a \generic" point of the space M as: there exists n such that (_ i n g i (A)): It is thus possible to interpret completely the proof of fact 2 in terms of such a \generic" point : We can in turn make sense of using the formal topological space M I : the value of (x) is the basic open set of M I de ned by x:
It is in turn possible to \eliminate cuts" on this proof and obtain a direct algebraic proof of fact 1. This is such a proof that we present.
We rst notice a direct corollary of proposition 1, given an ideal I of the boolean algebra B of closed open subsets of the space X which is such that g(I) I; where g is the morphism of B de ned by the continuous map f:
If x 2 B we introduce the notation S(x; n) for the element _ i n g i (x):
Corollary (of proposition 1): if y 1 _ : : : _ y k = 1 then Z I (x) whenever Z I (xS(y j ; n)) for all n and all 1 j k: We have also Z I (x) whenever Z I (x(1 ?y 1 )) and Z I (xS(y j ; n)) for all n and all 2 j k:
Proof: We prove the rst statement for k = 2; the proofs of the general case and of the other statement being similar. By proposition 1, we have Z I (x) if Z I (x(1 ? y 1 )) and Z I (xS(y 1 ; n)) for all n: By the same proposition Z I (x(1 ? y 1 )) holds whenever Z I (x(1 ? y 1 )(1 ? y 2 )) and Z I (x(1 ? y 1 )S(y 2 ; n)) for all n: But we have (1 ? y 1 )(1 ? y 2 ) = 0; and Z I (0) holds directly, and x(1 ? y 1 )S(y 2 ; n) xS(y 2 ; n): Hence the result by lemma 2.
Let I be the ideal corresponding to the open set W(3; l): Since f ?1 (W(3; l)) W(3; l); we have g(I) I: In algebraic term, fact 1 expresses 1 2 I: This is directly implied by Z I (1): Now, the corollary of proposition 1 shows that for proving Z I (x); it is enough to show Z I (xS(A; n)) for all n and for all block A of a given size (seeing this block as a closed open set of X).
In particular, for proving Z I (1) it is enough to prove Z I (S(E 0 ; n 1 )) for all n 1 and all block E 0 of size l: By using the second statement of the corollary, and writing x = S(E 0 ; n 1 ), for showing Z I (x) it is enough to show Z I (x(1 ? E 0 )) and Z I (xS(E 1 ; n 2 )) for all block E 1 of size 4n 1 that extends E 0 : Indeed, if y 2 ; : : :; y k is the list of all block of size 4n 1 that extends E 0 , then (1 ? E 0 ) _ y 2 : : : _ y k = 1 and we can hence apply the second part of corollary 2.
But Z I (x(1 ? E 0 )) is directly proved, because we have^i n 1 g i (x(1 ? E 0 )) = 0: Hence, to prove Z I (x), it is enough to prove Z I (xS(E 1 ; n 2 )) for all n 2 and all block E 1 of size 4n 1 that extends E 0 . In the same way, for proving Z I (S(E 0 ; n 1 )S(E 1 ; n 2 )) it is enough to prove Z I (S(E 0 ; n 1 )S(E 1 ; n 2 )S(E 2 ; n 3 )) for all n 3 and all block E 2 of size 4n 2 that extends E 1 :
Proceeding similarly, we get that it is enough to prove Z I (S(E 0 ; n 1 )S(E 1 ; n 2 ) : : :S(E p ; n p+1 )) for p large enough, where E j extends E j?1 and is of size 4n j :
We have then reduced the problem to nd p; n large enough such that the following element of B^i n g i (S(E 0 ; n 1 )S(E 1 ; n 2 ) : : :S(E p ; n p+1 )) belongs to the ideal I, where E j extends E j?1 and is of size 4n j :
We can think of such an element as a nite information about an in nite sequence , and this information, in some sense, is a nitary version of the fact that is minimal. For 2 l p and n large enough, we can nd a sequence B 0 ; : : :; B 2 l as in the proof of the fact 2 such that i n g i (S(E 0 ; n 1 )S(E 1 ; n 2 ) : : :S(E p ; n p+1 )) B 2 l :
The proof of the fact 2 shows in a constructive way B 2 l 2 I: Hence we get that 
A special lter of functions
Another application is the intuitionistic construction of a special kind of non principal ultra lter.
We start with the boolean algebra B = 2 N , together with the function g(x)(n) = x(n + 1): A point de nes then a special kind of lter of functions, that has interesting combinatorial properties. In term of points, g correspond to a continuous map f on the space X of ultra lters, and corresponds to an invariant non empty invariant subset. Any point of this subset de nes a non principal ultra lter. We refer to the paper 4] for a discussion on the analysis of the notion of ultra lters in formal topology.
A Reformulation of Hilbert's Program
One important component of Hilbert's program 9] is the following justi cation of non e ective reasoning. One sees the non e ective components of a proof of a theorem as purely \ideal" objects, having no \real existence", and the problem is to show how to eliminate the uses of these ctive objects in a given concrete instance of this theorem. For instance, talking about the axiom of choice, Hilbert says that the theory he is proposing does not intend to show that it is actually possible to make a choice, but that we can always proceed \as if" such a choice was possible 9]. If this can be done in general, this will ensure that no contradiction can follow from the uses of these \ideal" objects. To take an example given by Hilbert We think that some techniques of point-free, or formal, topology provide an illustration of this method reformulated in a constructive framework. Here the \ideal" objects are special kind of objects: namely points of a formal space X: In usual applications, the formal basic open of X are concrete object, and a point of X is a predicate over X. Thus, the ideal object that we try to use is a certain predicate over a set of concrete objects, and in most cases, it can be shown that this predicate cannot be de ned e ectively.
A formal space can be described as a set of (forcing) conditions on a point (see for instance 15]). As we have just said, this space may fail to have any e ective point. However, even if such points may fail to exist \absolutely", they exist always in a \relative" sense, namely in the sense of the logic de ned by the space X: By \changing logic", we can then proceed as if a given formal space had a point. This technique can be rightly described as one of the main tool of topos theory. 2 Thus, it is always possible to \explain" the meaning of these special \ideal" objects, and to introduce a point of the space X. The connection with Hilbert's program is now clear, and in order to illustrate further this connection, we have to show how to eliminate the use of the assumption that the space X has a point. This can be expressed as follows: if a concrete statement (like the statement above) is valid in a \relativised" sense, namely interpreted in the 2 See for instance 14] for one example of this technique; as shown in 5], this method can be used even in cases where, even classically, the formal space fail to have any point. An example is the formal space of surjective functions from natural numbers to a set X: This formal space is always consistent; but it has no point if X is for instance the function set f0; 1g N : logic de ned by the space X; is this statement valid \absolutely"? This is reduced to a question that concerns only the formal space X, namely that this space is not covered by the empty set.
In such a case, we say that the space X is consistent. If a space is consistent, we can transfer the truth of a concrete statement relative to the space X to an \absolute" truth. A stronger form of consistency that we shall meet is that any covering of the space X is inhabited. We say then that the space X is positive. It gives a stronger form of transfer for purely existential statements.
